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Abstract Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A
number of theorists hold that freedom (or, relatedly, opportunity) should either be
the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive
justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom
should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part,
theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have
failed to give proper attention to freedom across time. Given that we care about
personal freedom now, we have reason to care about future freedom too. But what
kind of distribution of freedom across a person’s lifetime should we promote as a
matter of legislation and public policy? I argue that none of the candidate principles
for the distribution of freedom across time is plausible. Neither a starting gate view,
nor a maximisation nor a sufficientarian view is satisfactory, because none ade-
quately reflects our various reasons to value freedom. I show that this result presents
a tough challenge for theories of distributive justice and paternalism that set great
store by personal freedom.
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I’ve been lookin’ for freedom.
I’ve been lookin’ so long.
I’ve been lookin’ for freedom.
Still the search goes on.
David Hasselhoff.
1 Introduction
Freedom is a fundamentally important ideal, yet, as David Hasselhoff observes, its nature
is so elusive one can spend a long time looking for it. One well-known reason for this is that
different concepts might be employed to spell out ‘freedom’.1 In this article, I add a
different and often overlooked challenge for invoking freedom in normative political
theorising: even if we settle on a particular concept and conception of socio-political
freedom at a particular point in time, this does not by itself tell us what kind of distribution
of freedom we should seek across time. It seems that if we have reason to care about a
person’s freedom now, we also have reason to care about her future freedom. However,
how much and what kind of freedom a person has in the future depends, among other
things, on her very own decisions, on how she exercises her freedom. This article is about
the intrapersonal, crosstemporal distribution of freedom (henceforth just intrapersonal
distribution). Specifically, I discuss what kind of distribution of freedom across persons’
lives we should promote as a matter of legislation and public policy. This article ultimately
ends with a negative result: none of the prima facie plausible candidates for a standard for
the intrapersonal distribution is plausible. This means we should either be less confident
about the role of freedom as a value in political theory or we should intensify our search for
a plausible standard for the intrapersonal distribution of freedom.
This result has important implications, as it presents a tough theoretical challenge
for normative political theories that set great store by personal freedom. First, a
number of theorists argue that freedom should be one of the central distribuenda in a
theory of distributive justice. However, without an account of the intrapersonal
distribution of freedom, such theories remain strongly underspecified. Second, how
paternalist interferences affect a person’s future freedom is often thought be an
important consideration in the justification of paternalism. Yet without an account
of the appropriate intrapersonal distribution of freedom, the precise relationship
between freedom and paternalism remains somewhat unclear. Given the importance
of this question, it is surprising that—to my knowledge—only one systematic
attempt has been made to theorise personal freedom across time (Carter 2013).2
I start by outlining how the intrapersonal distribution of freedom matters for
freedom-based theories of distributive justice and paternalism (Sect. 2). In Sect. 3, I
distinguish between a person’s freedom at a point in time and its intrapersonal
distribution and explain how this distinction matters for discussions of paternalism.
In Sect. 4, I discuss different standards for intrapersonal distribution and show that
none is plausible. In Sect. 5, I return to freedom-based theories of distributive
justice and paternalism.
1 One of the classic sources is (Berlin 1969b). See Carter et al. (2007) for an anthology of the many
different concepts and conceptions of freedom.
2 Although Fleurbaey (2005) writes on a related question to do with opportunities across time.
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2 Justice and paternalism
Before delving into the theoretical arguments of this article, let me add some
context by outlining two debates for which the problem of the intrapersonal
distribution of freedom matters in particular.
2.1 Freedom, opportunity and justice
A number of theorists hold that distributive justice is about the right distribution of
freedom. Others hold that, if not the only, freedom is at least one central
distribuendum amongst others (Carter 1999, chap. 3; Carter 2013; Norman 1987;
Van Parijs 1997; Pettit 2014; Sen 1999; Spencer 1873, 35; Steiner 1974b, 1994).
Other theorists defend the related view that egalitarian justice implies equality of
opportunities (Arneson 1989, 1991; Roemer 2000). For simplicity, I exclusively
focus on the distribution of freedom across time—though much of what I say
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the related concept of opportunities too.3
For example, consider how the intrapersonal distribution of freedom presents a
challenge for Philippe van Parijs’ theory of distributive justice. Van Parijs argues
that to extend ‘real freedom’ to all we should provide everyone with a basic income
(Van Parijs 1997). But, as van Parijs wonders himself, why not provide everyone
with an equal basic capital at one point in time instead (a ‘lump sum’)? Of course,
choosing the latter option risks ending up with undesirable outcomes. For example,
some people might end up destitute having squandered their capital early on.
However, opting for equal basic income, as van Parijs does, implies adopting a
particular standard for intrapersonal distribution. What shape should such a
distribution take exactly and why? In the absence of a standard for intrapersonal
distribution, and a principled defence thereof, van Parijs’ preference of basic income
over basic capital seems theoretically unmotivated.4 Note that the problem of
intrapersonal aggregation is not specific to van Parijs’ theory. Though van Parijs
raises the challenge most explicitly, other freedom-based theories will face it too.
2.2 Freedom and paternalism
How to distribute freedom across time is a challenge for discussions of paternalism
too. Most—though not all5—paternalistic interventions affect a person’s set of
3 Most writers think there is a strong conceptual connection between freedom and opportunities. Most—
though not all—hold that a person’s freedom is a function of her opportunities and/or that the right way to
evaluate a person’s set of available opportunities is in terms of freedom, see for example (Bossert et al.
1994; van Hees and Wissenburg 1999; Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Pattanaik and Xu 2000; Sen 1993).
4 The point is not that no justification is to be had in general but that van Parijs lacks a justification given
the normative starting point—a concern for individual freedom—of his own project. As Carter writes:
‘By explicitly embracing paternalism (however ‘mild’), Van Parijs effectively admits defeat in the search
for a ‘real libertarian’, respect-based justification for his preference for basic income over basic capital.’
(Carter 2013, 137).
5 (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Sunstein 2014) argue for libertarian paternalism which affects change
through choice architecture whilst leaving freedom of choice intact.
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available options and thus her freedom of choice. While not being the only ethical
challenge for paternalism, its effect on people’s freedom requires a justification.
Some argue that a concern for people’s freedom itself can provide one such
justification. On at least some interpretations, Mill made such an argument in cases
of voluntary slavery:
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person’s
voluntary acts is consideration of his liberty. […] But by selling himself for a
slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that
single act. […] The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free
not to be free. (Mill 1979, 173)
When engaging with Mill’s ideas on the topic, Dworkin (Dworkin 1972, 76) holds
that ‘paternalism is justified … to preserve a wider range of freedom for the
individual in question.’6 Similarly, Amartya Sen approvingly cites the above section
from Mill on voluntary slavery when discussing tobacco control. He suggests a
concern for personal freedom might sometimes favour more paternalist tobacco
control rather than less. He asks:
…how should we see the demands of freedom when habit-forming behaviour
today restricts the freedom of the same person in the future? Once acquired,
the habit of smoking is hard to kick, and it can be asked, with some
plausibility, whether youthful smokers have an unqualified right to place their
future selves in such bondage. (Sen 2007)
Of course, Sen’s tobacco case also raises issues of volitional autonomy and
addiction. But the intrapersonal distribution of freedom is clearly one important
aspect the above authors care about.
However, not everyone has been impressed with this idea. Richard Arneson
argues that Dworkin’s proposal puts us on a slippery slope: ‘Why not ban cigarettes
and fried foods on the ground that these shorten the individual’s life span and
thereby shrink the range of his freedom?’ (Arneson 1980, 474)7 As I discuss below,
Arneson’s slippery slope argument is too quick. Whether there really is a slippery
slope depends on what intrapersonal distribution we choose as a goal in public
policy. In the absence of such an answer, it is not clear at all that banning fried food
will be conducive to a desirable intrapersonal distribution of freedom.
Intuitively, ‘freedom-based paternalism’ seems a strong argument in favour of
some paternalist interventions. However, without a precise standard for intraper-
sonal distribution, it remains unclear which interferences it does or does not
condone.
6 Besides this consideration, Dworkin also offers a justification of paternalism in terms of actual and
hypothetical consent.
7 Whether this is a slippery slope in a problematic sense also depends on whether the result is
problematic. Conly (2013), for example, argues that a concern for people’s autonomy might best be
served through a wholesale tobacco ban. I discuss some issues regarding tobacco control in Schmidt
(2016b).
1416 A. T. Schmidt
123
3 Point freedom and its intrapersonal distribution
Before discussing the intrapersonal distribution of freedom, let me add two
clarifications.
First, I here focus on freedom as an opportunity-concept (Taylor 1979). Freedom
on this reading is about a person’s range of opportunities (though, again, how that
relates to opportunity-based egalitarian theories of justice is another, complex
question). Depending on how we spell out ‘opportunities’, we can broadly
distinguish two classes of theories. Views we might label ‘Restraint Views’ hold
that one is free, if and only if one is free from external interpersonal restraints
(Berlin 1969b; Carter 1999; Steiner 1974a, 1994). Theories within this class vary, of
course, depending on what obstacles they count as external interpersonal constraint
(Carter 1999, chap. 8; Kristja´nsson 1996; Miller 1983; Shnayderman 2013; Steiner
1994). Views we might label ‘Ability-based Views’ hold that freedom requires not
only being free from external, interpersonal constraints but also having the
capabilities to do things. This, in turn, requires having relevant external resources,
being free from external constraints and having the necessary internal abilities
(Kramer 2003; Van Parijs 1997; Schmidt 2016a; Sen 1988, 1991, 1999).8 For the
most part, I remain neutral between these two classes of theories in this article, as
questions regarding intrapersonal distribution apply to both.9
Second, my topic is the distribution of overall freedom across time. Overall
freedom is different from specific freedom. A specific freedom is the opportunity to
do a specific action or to be in a specific state. You have, for example, the specific
freedom to read this paper at this moment. Overall freedom, in contrast, refers to
how much freedom a person has overall. An account of overall freedom is typically
developed by aggregating specific freedoms or sets thereof. For the purposes of this
article, we can disregard the difficult question of how to measure freedom and work
with the following (simplistic) model: a person’s level of overall freedom at t is
simply the cardinality of the set of specific freedoms available to her at t.10 To
8 Kramer’s theory and my own combine, in different ways, the Restraint with the Ability-based View
(Kramer 2003, chap. 4; Schmidt 2016a).
9 My framework is neutral between many but not all theories of freedom. First, to keep things
manageable, I exclude discussion of freedom as referring to a person’s social or legal status (Pettit 2003;
Pettit 2007). For republicans like Pettit, freedom is not mainly about the range of a person’s opportunities
as such but about the absence of arbitrary power with respect to one’s basic liberties (Pettit 1997; Pettit
2012; Pettit 2014). Second, I also exclude libertarian, moralised theories of freedom here. The problem of
intrapersonal distribution applies to theories of status freedom and moralised views too, but it takes a
different shape. Finally, I do not discuss ‘positive freedom’ in the sense of psychological freedom. My
concern here is with theories of social freedom, that is, theories of freedom that are about a person’s
options and opportunities and not her psychological states, preferences and so on.
10 Pattanaik and Xu (1990) show that such a rule follows from three intuitive axioms. Most agree,
however, that a simple cardinality ranking is inadequate. I am setting aside six issues in particular. First,
most theorists use aggregation functions other than simple cardinality rankings. Carter (1999), Kramer
(2003) and Steiner (1983) use ratios, for example. Second, some theorists, such as Kramer (2003), argue
that instead of only counting freedoms we should assign evaluative weighting factors to freedoms. Third,
Carter (1999), Kramer (2003) and Steiner (1994) argue that overall freedom is a function not only of a
person’s specific freedoms but also her unfreedoms. Fourth, Carter (1999) argues that instead of
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sidestep the debate about whether a person’s overall freedom is a function of the
quantity of a person’s freedoms exclusively or whether it also needs to include their
quality, I will assume that all options are equally valuable (in the sense that they all
count equally no matter what the measure of freedom).
Now, remember that Mill argued we should prohibit voluntary slavery, as the
‘principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free’ (Mill
1979, 173). I think one—though not the only—important feature of the problem of
voluntary slavery is the following. Removing the option to become a slave is, in
some sense, an interference with a person’s freedom. At the same time, however,
letting a person sign up to be a slave implies that that person would lose many of her
future freedoms. I argue that we can make sense of these seemingly conflicting
intuitions. To do so, we should distinguish between Point in Time Overall Freedom
(henceforth just ‘Point Freedom’) and the intrapersonal distribution of Point
Freedom across time (henceforth ‘intrapersonal distribution’).
Point Freedom asks how much overall freedom a person P has at a specific point
in time t. P’s overall freedom at t is the sum of all the specific freedoms had by
P had t. The temporal aspects of specific freedoms are a bit tricky. In general, a
person’s specific freedom to do something carries two temporal indices. P at t has
the freedom to u at t ? n. t is what I call the ‘existence-time’ of P’s freedom, and
t ? n is the ‘actualisation-time’ of P’s freedom. For example, I might have the
specific freedom now (existence-time) to visit you in Toronto in 4 months’ time
(actualisation-time). However, if I commit a felony next month and will be
imprisoned for a year, then I will not have the freedom next month (existence-time)
to visit you in Toronto in 4 months’ time (actualisation time).
To determine a person’s level of Point Freedom, we can use different ranges of
actualisation-times. Accordingly, although Point Freedom focuses on one specific
point in time—the existence-time of the specific freedoms—it can have different
temporal extensions. It can cover all of the person’s future or a shorter span such as
the next 20 minutes or the next 20 years. Thus we could calculate how much overall
freedom I have now (existence-time) over the next 10 years (temporal extension), or
how much freedom I had last month (existence-time) for the rest of my life
(temporal extension) and so on. Because it does not matter whether a person is
inclined to choose a certain option or not, a person’s Point Freedom will include all
freedoms a person has no matter how unattractive they are and no matter how
unlikely a person is to choose them.
Gauging a person’s Point Freedom is different from gauging its intrapersonal
distribution, that is, how a person’s freedom is distributed across a period of time.
Imagine you are at a funeral and find yourself discussing with a friend how much
Footnote 10 continued
aggregating over individual freedoms, we should aggregate over sets of compossible freedoms (and
unfreedoms). Fifth, individual options should come with probabilities, and measures of overall freedom
should include probabilistic qualifications. Sixth, I here assume that we can make interpersonal com-
parisons in terms of freedom but do not specify how. One issue hereby is how to individuate specific
freedoms. Amongst others, Carter (1999) provides such a theory and specifically addresses the problem of
individuation.
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freedom Steve, the person who died, enjoyed over the course of his life. This is a
question about Steve’s intrapersonal distribution of freedom. Accordingly, we are
not gauging how much Point Freedom Steve had at a specific time t but how much
he had over different ‘points in time’ of his entire life. Maybe Steve started with a
life with lots of freedom when he was young. He then signed up for the army for
10 years during which many of this options were restricted. After these 10 years,
however, he received a good deal of money which he invested wisely to then
become a wealthy man. To gauge how Steve’s freedom was distributed over the
course of his life, we would have to see how much Point Freedom he had at the
different stages of his life. Of course, the intrapersonal distribution of Steve’s
freedom strongly depends on the decisions Steve made at various points in his life.
Had he moved to North Korea, for example, his freedom at subsequent times would
very likely have been much lower than it was in the actual world.
Just as Point Freedom, we can gauge intrapersonal distribution with different
temporal extensions. The normatively relevant temporal extension, which I mostly
focus on here, is freedom across whole lives or lifetime freedom as I will sometimes
call it.
We can determine a person’s intrapersonal distribution ex post by determining
how much freedom she had over some period in the past. But we can also try to
estimate how much freedom she will have distributed over a future period. Using
probabilities over what choices a person might make in the future, we can estimate a
person’s intrapersonal distribution of freedom ex ante.
Let us return to the case of voluntary slavery. For simplicity, I represent this as a
choice between the ‘slavery option’ D at t which will only lead to one future
freedom at t ? 1 and other options A, B, C, which will lead to more future






Fig. 1 Voluntary slavery
example
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have seven. If I choose C, I will have five. (For simplicity, I assume that the options
at t ? 1 made available through choices at t do not overlap) (Fig. 1).
A person’s level of Point Freedom at t is—so I have assumed for simplicity—the
number of options at t plus the options that ensue at t ? 1, so we get: 4 ? 22 = 26.
If we now follow Mill’s advice and remove the slavery option, we would reduce a
person’s Point Freedom at t to 3 ? 21 = 24. Therefore, by removing an option we
have reduced Point Freedom at t.
However, calculating a person’s intrapersonal distribution of freedom ex ante is
less straightforward. To do so, we take account of how likely a person is to choose
particular options. Using these probability judgements, we then calculate how likely
a person will have different levels of Point Freedom in the future.11 Note that, to
keep things simple, I for now assume that when we gauge the intrapersonal
distribution, we simply use the sum of a person’s Point Freedom at different points
in time within that period. In Sect. 4, I will relax this assumption and discuss
different types of intrapersonal distributions.
Let us use some toy numbers to show how to calculate ex ante a person’s
intrapersonal distribution. Assume we have reason to believe that P is equally likely
to choose either A, B, C or D at t, so the probability that she chooses any option is
pi = 0.25. If we now add her Point Freedom at t (where the temporal extension is t)
to the Point Freedom she is expected to have at t ? 1, then we get the following
results:
Intrapersonal Distribution ex ante (with D) = number of specific freedoms at
t ? expected number of specific freedoms at t ? 1 = 4 ? 0.25(9 ? 7?5 ? 1)
= 9.5
Let us now remove option D, the slavery option. Again, let us assume that P is
equally probable to choose any of the remaining three options (pi = 1/3).
12
Intrapersonal Distribution ex ante (without D) = 3 ? 1/3(9 ? 7?5) = 10
Therefore, if we remove the slavery option D, we expect the person to have more
freedom aggregated across time than if we did not remove D. So, if we care about
the sum of Point Freedom across time, we should prohibit voluntary slavery.
Increasing a person’s ex ante intrapersonal distribution of freedom is different
from increasing her Point Freedom. The ex ante intrapersonal distribution takes
into account the probabilities with which a person will have certain options in
future periods where these probabilities (partly) depend on how she is inclined to
act.
11 Here I do not attempt to specify how such probabilities are to be had.
12 I have made two simplifying assumptions. First, I have aggregated Point Freedom at different temporal
stages, where the temporal extension was limited to the temporal stage itself. Below I call this the
Discrete Segments Account and discuss alternatives. Second, I assumed in this example that the
probability-distribution is independent, that is, does not change (proportionally) when an option is
removed. But we do not need to assume independence for the general conceptual idea of the intrapersonal
distribution to be plausible.
1420 A. T. Schmidt
123
This gives us the following result: whether increasing the ex ante intrapersonal
distribution of freedom requires removing options like ‘voluntary slavery’ depends
on the following three factors:
a. What is the agent’s probability distribution over the different options?
b. To how many future options do individual options lead?
c. What standard do we use for the intrapersonal distribution of freedom?
In Sect. 2, I introduced ‘freedom-based paternalism’ as the idea that we can
sometimes justify interfering with people’s freedom, if doing so is necessary to
safeguard greater freedom in the future. We now see that whether interference
increases how much future freedom a person can expect to have depends on
(a) the overall probability distribution, (b) an option’s ‘fecundity’—that is, how
many future options it will lead to—relative to the fecundity of other options,
and (c) the standard we use for the intrapersonal distribution. Therefore, we
cannot say that to increase the ex ante intrapersonal distribution, any ‘low-
fecundity’ option, such as smoking or even becoming a slave, should always be
removed. If one is very unlikely to choose to smoke and/or choosing to smoke
results in only a little less freedom than the other options, then, depending on
one’s standard for intrapersonal distribution, removing the option to smoke
would not increase the intrapersonal distribution of freedom. This point also
helps us answer, or at least qualify, the objection raised by Arneson. He argues
that increasing a person’s future freedom leads us onto a slippery slope, as it
would imply banning things like fried food. However, whether this is really so
for individual options depends on the three factors mentioned above. It is not
clear, for example, that the freedom-reducing effect of removing different
options to eat fried food would be offset by an increase in the intrapersonal
distribution of freedom. Arneson’s slippery slope objection to freedom-based
paternalism is far too quick.
I think the distinction also dissolves the paradoxical nature around voluntary
slavery: previous to making any decision, prohibiting slavery does in fact make
people less free overall in terms of Point Freedom (at the time of the prohibition).
However, prohibiting slavery will typically lead to more freedom in the sense of a
higher ex ante intrapersonal distribution of freedom (depending on the three factors
mentioned above).
Before moving on, I should address the following worry. In Sect. 3, I stipulated
that this article is about freedom as an opportunity-concept, or what is sometimes
labelled ‘negative freedom’. Theorists working on this concept typically argue that
freedom cannot depend directly on a person’s preferences (or her pro-attitudes more
generally). Because theories that make freedom directly preference-dependent
would imply that a person can make herself (more) free simply by changing her
preferences without anything else changing in the outside world (Berlin 1969a,
xxxviii; Carter and Kramer 2008). Direct preference-dependence would betray a
conceptual confusion between freedom as an opportunity-concept and psychological
freedom.
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On my account, Point Freedom does not directly depend on a person’s
preferences. However, we have seen that a person’s preferences do matter for our
calculation of the intrapersonal distribution of Point Freedom (in influencing the
probability distribution over options for ex ante calculations and in influencing past
levels of Point Freedom for ex post calculations). Nonetheless, the idea of an
intrapersonal distribution of freedom is not guilty of a conceptual confusion
between freedom as an opportunity-concept and psychological freedom.13 For the
intrapersonal distribution of freedom is not in itself a separate concept or conception
of freedom. Freedom itself just is Point Freedom. Consider an analogy. Assume how
much wealth a person has at any given point is determined independently of that
person’s preferences (set aside complications regarding the behaviour-dependent
nature of long-term assets and debt). Nonetheless, when calculating a person’s
expected future wealth, her preferences should enter our calculations. For example,
if a person prefers spending her life in an ashram over pursuing a career in
investment banking, we have good reason to expect her to have less future wealth.
But including preferences in our calculation of expected future wealth still leaves
wealth itself a preference-independent quantity.
Similarly, a person’s preferences are clearly relevant when estimating future
levels of Point Freedom without freedom itself being directly preference-dependent.
For example, imagine your friend is planning a trip to North Korea to stage a
political protest she knows will land her in prison. Or imagine someone who desires
to do whatever is necessary to have low levels of Point Freedom (for example by
getting herself incarcerated). In both cases, it would be irrational—even for negative
freedom theorists—not to take into account the persons’ preferences when gauging
her intrapersonal distribution of Point Freedom.
Of course, negative freedom theorists might have normative reservations about
institutions or public policy makers trying to effect particular intrapersonal
distributions of freedom. But such normative reservations are very different from
the charge of conceptual confusion. While the aim of the present section has been
merely analytical, I now turn to normative questions regarding the intrapersonal
distribution.
4 Distributions of freedom across time
For simplicity, I have so far assumed that the intrapersonal distribution is simply the
sum of Point Freedoms that fall within the relevant period. I now drop this
assumption and discuss different procedures to distribute Point Freedoms across
time. The question now is what kind of distribution of freedom across time we
should promote as a suitable goal of public policy and legislation. I first briefly lay
out (what are often taken to be) reasons to value freedom in the opportunity-sense.
These reasons are relevant in the next steps of my main argument. The idea is that
13 Just to clarify: I do not claim that negative freedom theorists (such as Steiner, Carter and Kramer) have
themselves made the objection—the charge of conceptual confusion—I rebut here. My aim is to rebut a
possible objection to my framework.
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understanding what makes freedom valuable in general should also inform our
discussion of the appropriate intrapersonal distribution of freedom. Note that, for the
purposes of this article, I assume that freedom is valuable without defending this
assumption here
4.1 The value of freedom
Freedom can be intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. I will not discuss whether
freedom is intrinsically valuable or not. It is enough, if it turns out, as Ian Carter has
argued, that freedom has non-specific value (Carter 1999, chap. 2). Freedom has
non-specific value, if freedom is valuable over and above the goods that it facilitates
in individual instances. Put a bit simplified, freedom is non-specifically valuable if
having choice (or being from external constraints) matters over and above the value
of outcomes of one’s choices. Let me briefly mention a few reasons to think that
freedom is non-specifically valuable (not intended as an exhaustive list).14
The main consideration—which resonates with liberals in particular—is that
freedom is necessary for individuals in their capacity as autonomous agents to
pursue their own conception of the good. A number of more specific considerations
support this more general thought. One championed by Mill for example, is that
personal development and autonomy require experiencing different lifestyles.
Freedom is required for personal development. Relatedly, Hurka (1987) argues that
rejecting other options is necessary for autonomous agency.
We have further reasons to value freedom as a social value. In ‘real-life’
situations in which political decisions take place, we do not know everyone’s
preferences nor do we always know what is good for them. Moreover—and this
relates to the liberal thought above—we think it important to keep at last some
neutrality about conceptions of the good. Allowing persons a range of choice is
necessary, if we want to respect individuals, their decisions and underlying
conceptions of the good. We need not understand respect here as a source of
deontological duties (though we could). Instead, we can hold that personal freedom
is necessary to facilitate valuable, respectful forms of social interaction and
cooperation.
Another reason to value freedom—and one which is open to theories with very
different ideas about what goals institutions should pursue—comes from personality
change (Carter 1999, chap. 2). People like different things at different stages in their
lives. As a child I hated olives and coffee but like both very much today. Freedom is
also about safeguarding an adequate range of choice to allow for personality change
(whereby I mean to include both smaller changes in tastes and preferences as well as
more significant changes in character). This, in turn, is necessary for a person’s
well-being across time given uncertainty about future preferences and likings. I
think a failure to appreciate the normative importance of personality change comes
from what has been called the ‘end of history illusion’. People typically
14 For an overview of the value of freedom, see Carter (1999, chap. 2). I say a bit more about the different
reasons that make freedom valuable in Schmidt (2015).
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acknowledge that their personality has usually changed significantly over the last 10
years. Yet people of all ages tend to systematically underestimate the extent to
which their personality will change in the next decade. ‘History, it seems, is always
ending today’ (Quoidbach et al. 2013, 98).
Now, given these various ways in which freedom is often considered valuable,
how should it be distributed within lives?
4.2 The starting gate view
According to the Starting Gate View, we should concern ourselves exclusively with
the level of Point Freedom a person has at a ‘starting gate’. Such a view implies that
we should not try to facilitate any particular intrapersonal distribution after the
starting gate. Once persons have passed the starting gate, we should not prevent
persons from making choices, even if those choices leave them with very little Point
Freedom (as in the case of voluntary slavery, for instance).
I think the main normative consideration motivating the Starting Gate View is
respect for individuals and their choices. A commitment to preserving or promoting
freedom, on such a view, is about respecting people and their decisions.
Accordingly, if persons genuinely start with many alternatives and make their
own choices, we should just leave them to it. The Starting Gate View also blocks
attempts to justify paternalistic policies on the grounds that they redistribute
freedom favourably across time. This anti-paternalist stance would also mean that a
freedom-based theory of distributive justice would have to focus exclusively on the
social distribution of Point Freedom at one particular point in time. The Starting
Gate View would, for example, favour equal basic capital over equal basic income.
However, there is decisive reason against the Starting Gate View.
An initial problem is to find a temporal point at which to locate the ‘starting
gate’. Starting at birth is too early:
Jack and James: in a world in which schooling is optional, Jack and James
start with exactly the same level of freedom at birth (the same ‘starting gate’).
When Jack is ten he starts skiving off school most days which is why he later
misses out on a degree. James attends school regularly, graduates and goes on
to university. When James turns 26, he is wealthy and has lots of options.
Jack’s lack of a degree forces him to lead a very simple life with much lower
income and shorter life expectancy.
On a version of the Starting Gate View that locates the starting gate at birth, a
concern for Jack’s and James’s intrapersonal distribution of freedom does not speak
for compulsory schooling. Even though Jack will have much less future freedom
than James—and much less than he could have—the Starting Gate View would not
favour compulsory schooling. We might think that, intuitively, this speaks for a later
starting gate. Rather than at birth, we should set the starting gate at a time when
persons typically become sufficiently autonomous to take important decisions. Of
course, finding such a point is not trivial and will always involve some arbitrariness.
Among other reasons, growing into an autonomous agent seems more like a gradual
process than a binary one.
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But even if we set the starting gate at a later time, the Starting Gate View still
fails, because it does not account for some of our central reasons to value freedom.
One of the aforementioned reasons to value freedom was personality change.
Freedom can facilitate a good life in the face of changing personalities across time.
Safeguarding a suitable range of freedom in the future might sometimes be
sufficient justification to remove low-fecundity options.15 The Starting Gate View
fails to account for personality change. It pays no attention to uncertain interests of
future versions of existing persons and does not prevent a person from abridging all
those opportunities her future self might come to like or value.
Second, as mentioned above, freedom is required for personal development.
Here, the Starting Gate View runs into problems too. The Starting Gate View
ensures that agents have good opportunities for personal growth and development
early on. However, individuals that start off choosing options with very low
fecundity will lack opportunities for personal development later on. If we care about
personal growth and development, it seems we should also care about a person’s
future possibilities for personal growth and development.
Overall, the Starting Gate View is implausible, as it fails to account for some of
our reasons to value freedom. If freedom is to figure as a suitable goal of public
policy and legislation, focusing only on a person’s starting gate freedom is not
enough. Caring about people’s freedom sometimes gives us reason to prevent very
low levels of freedom, even if such low levels are the result of people’s own
choices.
4.3 The maximising view
Given that the Starting Gate View seems implausible, should we, through our
institutions and public policy, aim to maximise the sum of Point Freedom instead? If
yes, then a concern for a person’s lifetime freedom would justify a number of
paternalistic policies purely on the grounds that they would increase the sum of
future freedom (provided certain conditions hold, as discussed in Sect. 3).
To assess the Maximising View, we need to specify what precisely we should
maximise. Here, alas, we need another distinction. Aggregating freedom over time
is more difficult than aggregating most other goods. Consider, for example, most
standard views of wellbeing. When we consider how much wellbeing a person
enjoys at a particular point in time, we focus on aspects of that person’s life at that
point in time (for example, how happy that person is at that time, how much
pleasure she is experiencing, whether she is satisfied and so on). Freedom, on the
other hand, always ranges into the future (remember the existence-time and
actualisation-time distinction). This leaves us with different temporal extensions
over which we could aggregate. When we adopt an aggregative conception of the
appropriate intrapersonal distribution of Point Freedom, we can either use a Discrete
Segments Account or a Fresh Starts Account (Carter 2013, 139–40). When we use
15 Of course, people’s personalities might change less at later stages of their lives and it might be more
important to have more choice during one’s formative years rather than later.
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the Discrete Segments Account, we aggregate Point Freedom whose temporal range
is only up to the next temporal point at which we measure Point Freedom again. Say
we want to know how much freedom a person has in the next five years and we do
so by aggregating her Point Freedom every year (I only assume for this example that
segments are 1 year long).
On the Discrete Segments Account, we would add discrete segments in the
following sense: we first calculate the Point Freedom that includes all freedoms
whose actualisation-times lie in t, then we add this number to the Point Freedom that
includes all freedoms whose actualisation-times lie in t ? 1, then we add the Point
Freedom with all freedoms whose actualisation-times lie in t ? 2 and so on (Fig. 2).
Contrast this with a Fresh Starts Account. Here we aggregate over Point Freedom
at different stages of a person’s life calculating each time her freedom from that
point to her death (if we calculate lifetime freedom) (Fig. 3).
Accordingly, we would first calculate a person’s Point Freedom at t by
aggregating all freedoms with an existence-time t and with actualisation-times
between t and t ? 5. Then we would add this to the Point Freedom at t ? 1, which
we get by aggregating all freedoms with an existence-time t ? 1 and actualisation-
times between t ? 1 and t ? 5. And so on.
Let us see whether the Maximising View works with either the Discrete Segment
Account or the Fresh Starts Account. Let us start with the Fresh Starts Account.
When combined with the Fresh Starts Account, the Maximising View seems
problematically biased towards ‘end-heavy’ distributions of actualisation-times. Let
me explain what I mean. Imagine you could substitute a person’s freedom to do a
particular act soon with a freedom to do such an act, or a similar one, at the end of
her life (assume also that actualising either of these freedoms does not provide the
person with additional freedoms). Consider:
Coupon Booklet: we are putting together a booklet with coupons for our friend
Irina who is twenty-five years old. The booklet features coupons that give her
the freedom to go on a free holiday, visit the opera or eat at a fancy restaurant.
When setting the terms of the coupons, we have different options: we can
make all coupons redeemable during the next five years, make each coupon
redeemable during a different five year stretch, or make them all redeemable
during the last five years of Irina’s life.
On the Maximising View, we furnish Irina with highest lifetime freedom, if we make
all coupons redeemable during the last 5 years of her life (setting aside uncertainty),
because this way they exist the longest. As a result, these actualisable options would be
counted as separate freedoms in every measurement period. More generally, and other
things being equal, the later an option’s actualisation-time, the longer it exists and the
greater its contribution to the sum of Point Freedom across time.
Coupon Booklet shows that the Fresh Starts Account is biased towards freedoms
with late actualisation-times (other things being equal). Practically more relevant,
such a bias will also countenance relatively frequent interventions to curtail
freedoms that are freedom-reducing (again, depending on relative fecundity and an
agent’s probability distribution over the different options). Combined with the Fresh
Starts Account, the Maximising View would advise curtailing low-fecundity options
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to safeguard future freedoms comparatively often. For on the Fresh Starts Account it
becomes imperative to keep freedoms as long as possible, seeing that they are
counted in every measurement-period.
Is this implausible? On the one hand, one might think that keeping one’s freedom
involves keeping one’s options open. In this sense, the later your freedoms’
actualisation-times, or the less likely you are to choose early low-fecundity options,
the more freedom you will have across your life. But such thinking might become
implausible, if carried ad absurdum. Taken to extremes, we could imagine lives in
which people can actualise a great deal of freedoms at the end of their lives but can
actualise very few freedoms (with relatively low fecundity) beforehand.16 Such an
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Fig. 2 The Discrete Segments
Account
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Fig. 3 The Fresh Starts
Account
16 A bias towards end-heavy distributions of actualisation-times does not imply that people will have
very few freedoms before reaching old age. First, freedoms to do something in old age already exist
before that. In Coupon Booklet, for example, Irina in her twenties would already have the freedom to
redeem the coupons in her retirement age (the existence-time of those freedoms is already in her
twenties), but she can only actually redeem them during her retirement (the actualisation-time). Second,
an option that is actualisable late in life typically exists at all moments before. Such an option thus gives
rise to a different freedom at every measurement moment before in virtue of their different existence-
times. Third, the curtailment effect would imply that people will typically be free to actualise many of
their freedoms with high relative fecundity earlier on but not the freedoms with low relative fecundity.
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implication, I think, conflicts with some of our reasons to value freedom. The bias
towards late actualisation-times might significantly reduce a person’s opportunities
to pursue her own conception of the good. Most conceptions of the good life seem to
imply being in a position to pursue projects and make actual choices at earlier and
not only at later stages in life. Such choices require freedoms with earlier
actualisation-times, oftentimes including those that do not expand or even preserve
all of a person’s future freedoms.17 Moreover, a very ‘end-heavy’ distribution of
actualisation-times does not always sit well with a concern with personality change.
People change throughout life and this might require being able to actualise many
freedoms throughout one’s life (again, even low-fecundity ones). Moreover,
personality change typically slows down somewhat in old age, which further speaks
against a strong bias towards late actualisation-times (Caspi and Roberts 2001,
50–51). Finally, a person’s prospects to experience different lifestyles are
diminished, if too many of her freedoms can only be actualised towards the end
of her life or if she is prevented too often from choosing options relatively low in
fecundity. The Starting Gate Account’s bias towards late actualisation-times and
towards curtailing low-fecundity options does not sit well with our reasons to value
freedom.
A related, more fundamental, worry is that ‘slicing up’ a person across time to
then maximise the sum of freedom contradicts the liberal notion that freedom is a
value for respect-based social institutions. I do not attempt an analysis of ‘respect’
here. But a pre-theoretical understanding of respect suggests that we accept some or
most of an individual’s decisions and understand her to be a person pursuing plans
and taking responsibility for her decisions across time. Maximising the sum of a
person’s Point Freedom across time will often lead to tension with such respect for
individuals and their choices.
This example brings together the two aforementioned problems.
Juliette: Juliette is in her thirties. She is a ‘savoir-vivre kind of person’. She
loves opera, travel and good food. She would like to spend a good portion of
her income on these enjoyable pastimes.
On the Maximising View, a concern for Juliette’s freedom implies we ought, other
things being equal, prevent Juliette from spending her money as she sees fit. More
money means more freedom (on most accounts of freedom).18 But Juliette wants to
use her money for a type of consumption that does not preserve her wealth. Instead,
she should spend her money on things—such as real estate in upcoming
neighbourhoods—that preserve or even increase her spending power. Juliette could
17 This problem is aggravated because of a person’s preferences. If low-fecundity options form part of a
person’s conception of the good, she is more likely to choose them. Such a preference in turn makes it
more likely that we have reason to remove such options to maximise a person’s sum of Point Freedom (as
outlined in Sect. 3).
18 One might object that ‘more money more freedom’ assumes an Ability-based View such that freedom
implies a capability to do something. Cohen (2011), however, argues that even on a Restraint View, more
money implies more freedom. So, the argument is largely neutral between these two ways of
conceptualising freedom.
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maximise the sum of Point Freedom by spending her money in ways that expand her
options. So, to maximise Juliette’s sum of freedom across time, we might have to
prevent her from spending money on her favourite pastimes (depending on the
probability with which Juliette is going to choose a ‘savoir vivre kind of lifestyle’
and depending on its relative fecundity). As a result, Juliette will be able to actualise
high-fecundity options, such as buying the right real estate, earlier on. Much later in
life, she will then be able to spend the saved money on low-fecundity options.
However, forcing Juliette to save her money this way seems, first, to exhibit an
excessive bias towards an end-heavy distribution of actualisation-times and, second,
sit uneasily with respecting Juliette and the choices she makes as part of her
conception of the good.19
I think the Maximising View combined with the Fresh Starts Account is not
plausible. Is the Maximising View more plausible when combined with the Discrete
Segment Account? At least two considerations speak for such a combination.
First, freedoms enter our calculations only once within their respective segments,
even if their actualisation-times are at the end of a person’s life. Therefore, unlike
the Fresh Starts Account, the Discrete Segments Account is not biased towards late
actualisation-times.
Second, the Discrete Segment Account is somewhat less speculative in its
calculation than the Fresh Starts Account. Because predicting what options a person
can actualise within limited time-segments is easier than gauging all of the options
she can actualise between now and her death.
However, despite these advantages, the Maximising View combined with the
Discrete Segment Account is still implausible. Consider first these three general
reasons against the Discrete Segments Account.
First, Carter argues20:
The discrete-segment version is the simpler of the two, but it is also the less
plausible one. After all, the real degree of a person’s freedom at any given
time surely depends on her freedom to bring about events that are temporally
located at any subsequent time within her expected lifetime. Focusing at t1
only on those freedoms to perform actions located between t1 and t2 seems
plausible only if we think of the life of the person under consideration as itself
coming to an end at t2. (Carter 2013, 139–40)
When determining a person’s Point Freedom, it seems counterintuitive to focus
exclusively on options a person can actualise within a limited temporal segment.
Rather, all of her options, even those with later actualisation-times, seem relevant.
But if this is so for Point Freedom, the Discrete Segments Account involves a
theoretical disconnect between Point Freedom and its intrapersonal distribution.
Second, being able to make decisions that influence one’s life a few or even many
years down the line matters, if we care about how people can exercise agency across
19 While at odds with the drastic interventions in Juliette, our reasons to value freedom are not
necessarily incompatible with similar, but less drastic interventions, such as forcing people to save some
percentage of their money through social insurance schemes.
20 Note that Carter himself does not accept the Maximising Account. His own theory is discussed below.
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time. Indeed, many of our central life projects involve long-term options, for
example long-term financial planning, the kinds of professions we choose, the
family plans we make, and so on. The Discrete Segments Account seems to lose
relevant information about the extent to which agents are able to shape their lives
across a longer time horizon.
Finally, we might worry about the arbitrariness of fixing the length of these
temporal segments. Should the segments be a day, a year, 5 years, 10 years etc.?
That this is an open question is not a decisive reason against the Discrete Segments
Account. But it is a legitimate worry that no straightforward way to answer this
question suggests itself.
Besides these general worries, consider a problem particular to the combination
of the Maximising View and the Discrete Segments Account.
As said above, the Discrete Segments Account avoids a bias towards late
actualisation-times. But a different problem emerges. Compare the following
distributions of freedoms across segments (t to t ? 5) within a person’s life
(Table 1).
The Maximising View combined with the Discrete Segments Account simply
adds up the numbers in each segment. Accordingly, there is as much lifetime
freedom in D1 as in D2, as the sum is 605 for both. For D3, the sum is only 604. So,
on the Maximising View, the person has more lifetime freedom in D1 and D2 than in
D3. On the Discrete Segments Account, it is irrelevant how freedoms are distributed
across time. This is problematic. If we care about freedom, it seems we have reason
to disfavour intrapersonal distributions, such as D1 or D2, in which the person can
make more or less no choices for long stretches of her life. The more specific
reasons to value freedom mentioned above reinforce that point. For example, to
account for personality change and personal development, we have reason to secure
a certain range of actualisable options within segments across various stages of a
person’s life.21
In conclusion, the Maximising View is implausible, both when combined with
the Fresh Starts and the Discrete Segments Account.
21 This point is reinforced, if freedom has decreasing marginal value. This would bolster our case against
the Maximising View both when coupled with the Fresh Starts and the Discrete Segments Account.
Because freedom having decreasing marginal value would speak against both overly end-heavy
distributions of actualisation-times (Fresh Starts Account) and against temporally very unequal
distributions (Discrete Segments Account). Whether freedom has decreasing marginal value might
depend, among other things, on how we trade off or prioritise different reasons for valuing freedom.
Given limited space, the question is too complex to address here. Let me nonetheless forestall one salient
objection: does freedom having decreasing marginal value not assume the purely quantitative (or strictly
non-evaluative) view of freedom? Not so. Freedom can have decreasing marginal value even if the
measurement of freedom itself contains evaluative aspects. For we can hold that the type of value that
(inter alia) determines a person’s level of freedom is not the same as the all-things-considered value that
a certain level of freedom has for that person. Consider an analogy: gauging how much beauty a person is
exposed to might require evaluative criteria (because, say, beauty is a thick evaluative concept). But
beauty could still have decreasing marginal all-things-considered value such that extra ‘units’ of beauty
increase a person’s flourishing less the more beauty she is already exposed to. In general, see Carter
(1999, chap. 5), Dworkin (1988, chap. 5) and Schwartz (2009) for discussions of the marginal value of
choice and freedom.
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4.4 The sufficiency view
We could take inspiration from Dworkin (1982, 81) and hold that ‘[i]n the realm of
choice, as in all others, we must conclude—enough is enough’. Instead of
maximising freedom across time, maybe we ought to ensure that people have
enough freedom at all times. Legislation and public policy should make sure a
person’s freedom remains above a certain threshold at all times.
However, the Sufficiency View alone is implausible. Compare two lives. Life 1
starts well above the threshold and remains high throughout. Life 2, on the other
hand, is always just slightly above the threshold (Fig. 4).
If we adopt a person’s freedom across time as a suitable goal for institutions and
public policy, it seems we have good reason to facilitate lives that are more like Life
1 than Life 2. A normative political theory—for example, a theory of justice—that
would treat them equivalently would miss something important. For this reason, Ian
Carter suggests combining the Sufficiency View with the Starting Gate View
(Carter 2013). Let us call this the Combined View:
C1: allow only those lives in which Point Freedom is above the threshold at all
times.
C2: out of these, choose the life with the highest starting gate freedom.22
What speaks for the combined view?
First, the Combined View seems to take on board the idea that one aspect of
valuing a person’s freedom is about respecting her decisions. Unlike the
Maximising View, the Combined View gives people a good starting position and
then largely refrains from trying to effect a specific distribution of people’s freedom
across time. Thus, the Combined View does not require, for example, that we put a
prohibitive cap on Juliette’s expenses on good food, travel and opera.
Second, unlike the Starting Gate View, the Combined View takes into account
personality change, personal development and autonomy—at least to some extent.
Future versions of current people have interests and one of them is freedom.
Through securing enough freedom in the future, we try to prevent that future
versions of a person lead lives with very little Point Freedom.
The Combined View seems more ‘balanced’ than the Starting Gate and the
Maximising View. However, Carter’s Combined View—the only systematic
Table 1 Counterexample to the Maximising view with the Discrete Segments Account
t t ? 1 t ? 2 t ? 3 t ? 4 t ? 5
D1 600 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 600
D3 101 101 101 101 100 100
22 Carter furthermore suggests for C2 that we choose the greatest equal freedom when faced with
interpersonal distributions (Carter 2013, 142).
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account offered to date—faces a number of theoretical challenges. The sufficiency
criterion C1 invites the question as to where such a level of sufficiency is to be
had—a notoriously difficult problem for any threshold view. Moreover, at which
temporal point in a person’s life should we locate a person’s starting gate for our
criterion C2? I doubt there are ‘correct’ theoretical answers to both questions. But
even if Carter can provide satisfactory answers to these questions, other more
troubling problems already make the Combined View implausible, as I argue now.
A major problem for the Combined View is to deal with situations in which
people have very few freedoms they can actualise close in time. Consider again the
distinction between the Fresh Starts and the Discrete Segments Account. If we
understand the sufficiency criterion C1 according to the Fresh Starts Account, the
Combined View runs into problems similar to those seen in connection with the
Maximising View. In some scenarios, a person might have many freedoms with
actualisation-times much later in life but very few freedoms with close actualisa-
tion-times. Imagine, for example, a person is thrown in jail for a long time but then
compensated with numerous freedoms with actualisation-times much later in her
life. She has extremely few freedoms with actualisation-times that fall within her
time in prison and would thus be able to make very few choices during that time
(though she has numerous freedoms with actualisation-times after her time in
prison). On the Fresh Starts Account, she would not have insufficient freedom
during her time in prison. For she has a lot freedoms with existence-times that fall
within her time in prison. Unfortunate for her, most of those freedoms can only be
acted on—or actualised—much later in life. Therefore, if C1 is understood along the
lines of the Fresh Starts Account, C1 would condone imprisonment that is
compensated with freedoms with late actualisation-times. I think this result should
strike us odd, particularly if we are concerned with making sure people have
sufficient choices throughout their lives. As before, the distribution of actualisation-
times seems to matter too. This is a serious issue for the Combined View as
presented by Carter, because Carter favours the Fresh Starts Account.
Can we circumvent this problem, if we understand the sufficiency criterion C1
according to the Discrete Segments Account? Remember that I discussed some
general problems with the Discrete Segments Account in Sect. 4.3. These problems
would apply here too. Of these, setting the length of the segments will pose a
particularly important challenge. Consider:
Flying: I am on a 24 h flight from Europe to Australia. During the flight I have
extremely few freedoms I can actualise.
Flying shows that our segments should not be too short. If we used very short
segments, such as two days, then C1 would rule out the option to fly to Australia,
because I would have insufficient freedom during the flight (remember the Discrete
Segments Account only includes freedoms with actualisation-times that fall within
the specific segments). If segments are longer, say one year each, C1 would
typically not discountenance the option to fly long distance. For the options I can
actualise after my flight should typically move me above the threshold for the
segment as a whole. The challenge then is to fix the length of segments in a
theoretically non-arbitrary fashion.
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More problematically, a different example shows that temporary lack of freedom
causes trouble for the Combined View both when coupled with the Fresh Starts and
when coupled with the Discrete Segments Account. Both views would rule out lives
in which insufficient freedom comes at the end of a person’s life.
Football: Carla is very particular about sports. The only sport she likes to play
is football. If she is allowed to play football she will live to become 80 years
old. However, because Carla has a hereditary illness that will break out by the
time she reaches 78, she will be bedridden for the last 2 years. If she is not
allowed to play football, Carla will choose a very unhealthy lifestyle which
will result in a fatal heart attack when she is 55.
Assume Carla’s condition between 78 and 80 grants her insufficient freedom while
her level of freedom during her unhealthy life is always above the threshold.23
According to the Combined View, a concern for Carla’s intrapersonal distribution of
freedom means we should prevent Carla from playing football, because this would
result in a life in which Carla never falls below the sufficiency level. This is so on
both the Discrete Segments and the Fresh Starts Account. This prescriptive
conclusion, however, seems implausible. For Carla would still lead a life with high
levels of freedom between the age of 55 and 78 and preventing Carla from playing
football means she would be missing out on those years.






Fig. 4 Counterexample to the Sufficiency View
23 We might worry that Football seems to assume the Ability-based View. But we could assume Carla
would develop a mental illness between 78 and 80 requiring external constraints on her freedom. This
would cover Football on both the Restraint and the Ability-based View of freedom.
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So, where does that leave us? Various normative reasons to value freedom pull in
different directions. For example, freedom is valuable, because it can secure good
options in the face of nearly everyone undergoing personality changes at various
points in their life. But freedom is also important for respect-based interpersonal
relationships. Moreover, we have seen that it is not clear whether we should apply
the Discrete Segments or the Fresh Starts Account—different cases pull in different
directions. We have therefore not found a straightforward intrapersonal distribution
of Point Freedom that does justice to the various normative considerations typically
connected to freedom. Neither a Starting Gate, Maximising, Sufficiency nor
Combined View does the job.24
5 Distributive justice and paternalism
The prima facie plausible candidates for the intrapersonal distribution of freedom all
failed to do justice to our various reasons to value freedom. Of course, this is not an
impossibility theorem—someone else might find a standard for distributing freedom
intrapersonally that solves these problems. Nonetheless, let me mention some of the
implications this (potentially provisional) result has for freedom-based paternalism
and distributive justice.
5.1 Paternalism
Freedom-based paternalism holds that some paternalist interventions can be
justified, if they are necessary to improve someone’s intrapersonal distribution of
freedom. On the one hand, my discussion brought out that a person’s freedom across
time is often a salient consideration for paternalism. Distinguishing between Point
Freedom and the intrapersonal distribution of Point Freedom showed how
paternalistic interferences are often not just simple infringements of freedom but
redistributions thereof across time. Paternalist interventions, such as the prevention
of voluntary slavery, might reduce Point Freedom at some point but increase its
intrapersonal distribution overall. Similarly, a law to make seatbelts compulsory
might prevent freedom-reducing, incapacitating accidents. Preventing drug addic-
tions might put people in a position to enjoy more future freedom. Compulsory
schooling might be a suitable means to safeguard a person’s future freedom as
shown in Jack and James. As seen in Sect. 3, whether a concern for freedom across
time implies removing a freedom-reducing option depends on that option’s
24 One well-known alternative for interpersonal distributions is prioritarianism (i.e. giving priority to
people proportional to how little they have of a distribuendum). But what motivates prioritarianism for
interpersonal distributions does not really apply to the intrapersonal case. We are not concerned with
balancing fairness and maximisation. Instead, we are concerned with respecting people’s fundamental
decisions about their lives whilst at the same time ensuring good levels of freedom for future versions of
that person. Moreover, intrapersonal prioritarianism would still face the issue of choosing between the
Discrete Segment and the Fresh Starts Account.
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fecundity relative to other options, the probability distribution of an agent’s
decisions over these options and on one’s standard for intrapersonal distribution.
On the other hand, however, freedom-based paternalism appeared to have
significant justificatory limitations. Because we have not found a plausible standard
for distributing freedom intrapersonally, freedom-based paternalism does not by
itself provide a clear, principled justification for paternalistic policies. How far is
this a problem?
First, in some situations, a paternalistic interference might be necessary to
safeguard a certain level of freedom across a number of standards for intrapersonal
distribution. For example, some interferences might be called for on both the
Maximising and the Sufficiency View and on different combinations with the
Discrete Segments and the Fresh Starts Account.
Second, freedom-based paternalism seems to provide one but clearly not the only
relevant consideration when discussing paternalism. We might need other principled
criteria, deontological constraints for example, to construct a plausible ethical
theory of paternalism. Such a comprehensive theory would put us in a better
position to determine which instances of paternalism are justified and which ones
are not. So, by itself, freedom-based paternalism often fails to provide clear
principled guidance. But this does not mean, of course, that a principled basis from
which to justify certain paternalist interventions—and rule out others—is not to be
had in general.
5.2 Distributive justice
The implications for freedom-based theories of distributive justice are, I think, quite
serious. Without a plausible standard for the intrapersonal distribution of Point
Freedom, it remains unclear what it means to distribute freedom in a just way
between persons. For example, many authors think that justice requires that we aim
for greatest equal freedom (or, relatedly, for greatest equal opportunities). What
does this mean exactly? A Starting Gate View would answer this question very
differently than a Maximising View, for example. This is particularly problematic
for theorists—for example, left-libertarians such as Steiner and van Parijs—who
hold that freedom is the only relevant distribuendum.
What about theories of distributive justice that take freedom (or opportunities) to be
one amongst other relevant distribuenda? Such theories might simply pick one of the
intrapersonal distribution principles discussed here and add further principles. These
other principles might feature different distribuenda, could be deontological side-
constraints or something else. This way, we might arrive at a set of principles that
together gives us plausible judgements in cases in which any of the principles of the
intrapersonal distribution of freedom led to implausible judgements on their own.
Together, such principles might give us a plausible extension. However, if the
arguments of this article are successful, such a strategy will at least be theoretically
unsatisfactory. While we might arrive at a plausible extension, we might not do so for
all the right reasons. For the chosen principle for the intrapersonal distribution of
freedom will still fail to adequately reflect our different reasons for valuing freedom.
For example, imagine our pluralist view would assume the Starting Gate View of
An unresolved problem: Freedom across lifetimes 1435
123
freedom and add a proviso that tells us to secure the social and material conditions
minimally necessary to safeguard a person’s dignity. Now, the latter principle would
presumably imply outlawing slavery contracts to prevent undignified social relation-
ships. But this theory will still involve an inadequate picture of what it means to care
about a person’s lifetime freedom. For it is not only because of a person’s dignity that
we should prevent voluntary slavery, a concern for personal freedom seems to require
that too. And the Starting Gate View fails to capture this point.
This article thus ends with an unresolved problem. It is intuitive to believe—and
often believed—that freedom is an important distribuendum in a theory of
distributive justice. Moreover, it seems rational to not only care about one’s current
freedom but also one’s future freedom. However, it is not clear what precisely
follows from such a commitment, if we do not answer the question as to how
freedom should be distributed across lifetimes. And none of the suggestions
discussed here provides a plausible answer.
The negative result in this article leaves us with the following options (and
possibly others).
First, we might continue searching until we find a plausible standard for the
intrapersonal distribution of freedom. (As David Hasselhoff sings: ‘still the search
goes on’.)
Second, we might call off the search and be more sceptical about the power of
freedom-based views of distributive justice to generate clear prescriptions. Those
who are critical of the role of freedom in normative political theorising in general
will see this as an additional objection to freedom-based views of anything. Others
might want to continue endorsing freedom as a relevant distribuendum and assume
one of the principles of intrapersonal distribution of freedom discussed here but also
add further principles to arrive at intuitive all-things-considered judgements.
However, as noted before, while this might give us intuitive judgements in
individual cases, this option is theoretically unsatisfactory inasmuch as our principle
of freedom therein would not be fully plausible in itself.
Finally, we might interpret the absence of a clear intrapersonal principle as just
another example of the limitations of normative political theorising in general:
normative political theorising will always leave us with significant indeterminacy; it
is the task of political theory to reduce such indeterminacy, not to eradicate it.
I leave it to the reader to choose from these options.
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